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STUDENT NOTES AND COMMENTS
Constitutional Law" Power of a State to Exclude a Foreign Corpo-
ration Seeking to do Intrastate Business
A corporation, being created by a single parent state, is not
necessarily recognized by other states. A state is under no compul-
sion, constitutional or otherwise, to permit a foreign corporation to
carry on any intrastate business,' though comity does impel most
states to admit foreign corporations. The general rule is that a
state may arbitrarily exclude any foreign corporation if doing so
does not directly affect either interstate commerce- or business of
a federal nature.'
Consideration of this rule necessitates a study of the Federal
Constitutional sections involved. Article IV, Sec. 2, provides:
"The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privi-
leges and immunities of citizens in the several states."
The Fourteenth Amendment provides:
No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due proc-
ess of law- nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws."
tJntil 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the
main argument advanced by a foreign corporation which was seek-
ing admission into a state was that the corporation was a citizen
within the meaning of Article IV and was entitled to the privileges
and immunities accorded the citizens of the several states. This
theory was given no weight by the early justices of our Supreme
C8urt, who flatly declared that a corporation is not a citizen of a
state within the meaning of this clause of our Constitution.' And
much later, in 1928, the Supreme Court said:
' Railway Express Agency v Virginia, 282 U.S. 440, 51 Sup. Ct.
201, 75 L.E. 450 (1931) Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 48 Sup. Ct.
577, 72 L.E. 978 (1928).
"Horn Silver Mining Company v New York State, 143 U.S. 305,
314, 12 Sup. Ct. 403, 36 L.E. 164, 168, (1892) Pensacola Telegraph
Company v Western Union Telegraph Company, 96 U.S. 1, 12-13, 24
L.E. 708, 711-712 (1878).
Fidelity & Deposit Company v Brown, 92 Vt. 390, 104 AtI. 234
(1918), see Hooper v California, 155 U.S. 648, 652, 15 Sup. Ct. 207,
39 L.E. 297, 299-300 (1895) (recognizes rule) Cf. Home Owners' Loan
Corporation v Stookey et ux., 59 Idaho 267, 81 P 2d 1096 (1938) in
which the court decides that H.O.L.C. is not actually a "foreign
corporation" within any state in the United States.
'Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 19 L.E. 357 (1869) Bank of
Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 10 L.E. 274 (1839)
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"It is a settled doctrine that a corporation organ-
ized under the laws of one state may not carry on local
business within another without the latter's pernus-
sion, either express or implied. A corporation is not a
mere collection of individuals capable of claimng all
benefits assured them by Article IV, Sec. 2 of the Con-
stitution. ' ' 5
The Fourteenth Amendment was passed primarily to assure
southern Negroes all the rights that their former masters enjoyed.
It did not take corporations very long to endeavor to be included
under the wide guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
clauses which the foreign corporations attempted to construe to
this end were due process and equal protection for persons (instead
of citizens).'
A court need not determine whether or not a foreign corporation
seeking admission is a person under the equal protection clause, for
it can easily handle the problem in the following manner. Admitting
that a state cannot deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the law, a foreign corporation which has not been
admitted is obviously not within the jurisdiction. Therefore, denial
by the state of entrance thereto does not deprive the corporation of
equal protection to any greater extent than, for instance, immigration
officials deny due process in arbitrarily refusing an alien entrance
into this country An interesting application of this rule in Illinois
may be found in People v. Women's Home Missionary Society of
M. E. Church, where a testator left a legacy to a foreign corporation
-which had offices in Chicago and orphanages and deaconess' homes
throughout the state. The state imposed an inheritance tax upon the
legacy though admittedly none would have been imposed had the
recipient been a domestic corporation; and it was held that, as the
foreign corporation had not placed itself within the jurisdiction of
the state, such taxation did not deny to any person within the juris-
diction of the state the equal protection of the law.
The eoual protection clause was also considered in Lincoln
National Life Insurance Company v. Read,' where more onerous
conditions were imposed upon the foreign corporation than upon
domestic corporations. The Court, quoting from Philadelphia Fire
Association v. New York,* said:
Hemphill v Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 548, 48 Sup. Ct. 577, 72 L.E.
978, 983 (1928)
Privileges and immunities reiterated, but in a different form
which doesn't concern the present problem. For the distinction in the
two privileges and immunities clauses, see Slaughterhouse Cases, 83
"U.S. 36, 21 L.E. 394 (1872).
303 Ill. 418, 135 N.E. 749 (1922)
'325 U.S. 673, 65 Sup. Ct. 1220, 89 L.E. 1861 (1945)
'119 U.S. 110, 119, 7 Sup. Ct. 108, 30 L.E. 342, 347 (1886)
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"The state having the power to exclude entirely has
the power to change the conditions of admission at any
time, for the future, and to impose as a condition the
payment of a new tax, or a further tax, as a license fee
[and until the corporation] pays such license fee
[it] is not admitted within the state or within its juris-
diction. It is outside at the threshold seeking admission,
with consent not yet given."
On the other hand, no method of handling the due process
clause will circumvent a decision as to whether or not a corporation
is a person. The courts hold that the liberty which is guaranteed
under the Fourteenth Amendment is a liberty of natural, not artifi-
cial, persons.'" The property element of due process is more difficult.
In one sense property may be considered the right to earn profits
from the operation of a business, but the property of which a person
cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment does not include the right of a foreign corporation to
extend its business and membership into a state which otherwise may
exclude it from its boundaries." However, if a corporation has been
carrying on intrastate business or has in some manner acquired
property in a state, although the state may refuse to admit the corpo-
ration, it cannot deny the corporation due process as to the property
already within the state.
Of the large number of corporation cases that arise under the
Fourteenth Amendment, only a few are concerned with state exclu-
sion of a foreign corporation. In many cases there appear statements
that a corporation is a person within the meaning of the due process
and equal protection clauses. These cases, however, are piot ones
concerned with foreign corporations seeking to do intrastate business,
but occur either in domestic corporation cases or where a foreign
corporation is attempting to have a condition of admittance declared
unconstitutional or to assert a legal right. Even here the courts are
not in accord in their reasoning. For instance, in Kentucky Finance
Corporation v. Paramount Auto Exchange Corporation,- a Kentucky
,0 Hague, Mayor, et al. v. Committee for Industrial Organization,
et al., 307 U.S. 496, 527, 59 Sup. Ct. 954, 83 L.E. 1423, 1443 (1939)
Western Turf Association v. Greenburg, 204 U.S. 359, 27 Sup. Ct. 384,
51 L.E. 520 (1906), Northwestern National Life Insurance Company
v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 27 Sup. Ct. 126, 51 L.E. 168 (1906). But see:
Grosjean, Supervisor of Public Accounts of Louisiana v. American
Press Company Inc., et al., 297 U.S. 233, 56 Sup. Ct. 444, 80 L.E. 66G
(1936) (holding that under the First Amendment to the Federal
Constitution a domestic corporation is entitled to protection against
arbitrary state taxation)
" National Council of the Junior Order of United Mechanics of
the United States v State Council of Virginia, Junior Order of
United American Mechanics of the State of Virginia, 203 U.S. 151,
163, 27 Sup. Ct. 46, 51 L.E. 132, 137 (1906).
2262 U.S. 544, 43 Sup. Ct. 636, 67 L.E. 1112 (1923)
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corporation sought to replevy an automobile wrongfully taken from
it and found in Wisconsin in the possession of a Wisconsin corpora-
tion. A Wisconsin statute creating a more difficult procedure for for-
eign corporations which bring suits in Wisconsin courts was held
invalid. The Court stated that the corporation was a person within
the meaning of both the due process clause and the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that a nonresident corpo-
ration going into a state to recover possession of property wrongfully
taken from it and brought into that state is within the protection of
the Fourteenth Amendment that no state shall deny any person
within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws. However, in
Railway Company v. Whitton's Administrator " a completely differ-
ent approach was used by Justice Field, who said:
"Although a corporation, being an artificial body
created by legislative power, is not a citizen within the
several provisions of the Constitution; yet it has been
held, and that must now be regarded as settled law,
that, where rights of action are to be enforced, it will be
considered as a citizen of the state where created, within
the clause extending the judicial power of the United
States to controversies between the citizens of the dif-
ferent states.""
It would seem that the reasoning in the latter case, which bases
the foreign corporation's right on diversity of citizenship, is far bet-
ter than the reasoning in the former where the right is based upon
the proposition that a corporation is a person within the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Most of the cases concerning foreign corporations arise under the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions," and concern corporations
already within the state. No small part of the controversies has been
started by state jealousy of the foreign corporation's right to remove
cases to a federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. The
propositions that a state cannot condition admittance of a corporation
upon its surrender of the privilege of suing in a federal court and
that a stat e cannot exclude a foreign corporation solely because it did
take a case to the federal court are too well settled to require com-
ment.'" Virginia, nevertheless, successfully evaded a long line of de-
cisions to this effect by requiring all foreign corporations to incorpo-
rate in Virginia before carrying on intrastate business, thereby mak-
" 80 U.S. 270, 20 L. Ed. 571 (1871)
" Railway Company v Whitton's Administrator, 80 U.S. 270, 283,
20 L.E. 571. 575-576 (1871).
' For a comprehensive discussion of this doctrine, see HENDER-
SON, THE POSITION or FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW (1918) Also Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions (1929)
77 U. PA. L. REV. 879.
'" Supra, note 15,
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ing it impossible for the corporations to take many of their cases to
the federal courts on the basis of diversity of citizenship. The test of
this constitutional provision'" came in Railway Express Agency v.
Virgmia.' The Supreme Court, after refusing to look behind the
action to see its purpose and after finding that there was no burden
upon interstate commerce, held that Virginia could prevent the Rail-
way Express Agency from carrying on intrastate business unless it
incorporated there. This point seems to have been so well settled
that the attorney for the corporation in Atlantic Refining Company
v. Commonwealth of Virginia'9 conceded it. More recently, in Asbury
Hospital v. Cass County," the Supreme Court reiterated the old, time-
worn principles involved. North Dakota had passed a statute giving
corporations ten years to dispose of farm lands owned by them. At
the end of the period North Dakota took the property belonging to
the hospital, a foreign, non-profit corporation, and sold it. The
Supreme Court held the statute and the action taken under it valid,
saying:
"Appellant [foreign corporation) is neither a
citizen of a state nor of the United States within the
protection of the privileges and immunities clauses of
Art. IV Sec. 2 of the Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment.
"The Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to the
state power to exclude a foreign corporation from doing
[intrastate] business or acquiring or holding property
within it.
"But a state's power to exclude a foreign corpora-
tion, or to limit the nature of the business it may con-
duct within the state, does not end as soon as the corpo-
ration has lawfully entered the state and acquired im-
movable property.
"The due process clause does not guarantee that a
foreign corporation when lawfully excluded as such
from ownership of land in the state shall recapture its
c o s t s . , , .1
These recent cases seem to follow the rules laid down in Paul V.
Virginta and Bank of Augusta v. Earle.2' In the latter case, which
was decided more than one hundred years ago, Justice Taney, with
keen foresight, wrote:
"The clause of the Constitution referred to [Art. IV
Sec. 2] certainly never intended to give to the citizens
of each state the privileges of citizens in the several
Constitution of Virginia, Sec. 163 (1902).
'" 282 U.S. 440, 51 Sup. Ct. 201, 75 L.E. 450 (1931)
'p302 U.S. 22, 58 Sup. Ct. 75, 82 L.E. 24 (1937).
326 U.S. 207, 66 Sup. Ct. 61, 90 L.E. 1 (1945).
326 U.S. 207, 66 Sup. Ct. 61, 63-64, 90 L.E. 1, 3-5 (1945).
"75 U.S. 168, 19 L.E. 357 (1869).
=38 U.S. 519, 10 L.E. 274 (1839)
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states. Besides it would deprive every state of all
control over the extent of corporate franchises proper
to be granted in the state; and corporations would be
chartered in one, to carry on their operations in another-
It is impossible upon any sound principle to give such
construction to the Article in question."2'
The dangers that Justice Taney pointed out are perhaps more
real today than then. Foreign corporations now are larger and more-
powerful, having a natural tendency to strangle both individual en--
terprise and the relatively smaller domestic corporations. A state can
keep the interests of big and little business balanced only if it can
completely regulate its corporations. To force a state to admit all
foreign corporations and to grant them all the privileges and im-
munities accorded domestic corporations would be to destroy this
balance and to take a big bite out of "states' rights."
Today with the exception of those corporations engaged in in-
terstate commerce and those doing business of a federal nature, a
state can arbitrarily exclude all foreign corporations. This is the
proper rule if one qualification is made. A state should not be able
to exclude arbitrarily a certaih corporation while it admits all others
of a similar nature. This does not mean that a state should not set
up classes of foreign corporations-such as insurance, transportation,
banking, or industrial-in the same manner in which it classified its
domestic corporations. Indeed, the same classification which a state
makes of its domestic corporations would be the proper one for it to
use. Having established such a classification, a state need not allow
a single foreign corporation of that class to enter even though many
domestic corporations of the same class are carrying on business
there. The state should also be permitted to set a quota if it reason-
ably deems one necessary
In short, the one word arbitrarily should be stricken from the
rule, and the simplest method of accomplishing this is through judi-
cial interpretation of the Fourteen Amendment to our Constitution.
RussEL C. JONES
- 38 U.S. 519, 586-587, 10 L.E. 274, 307 (1839)
